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Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California, Nos. 10-17803, 10-17878, ___ F.
3d ___, 2015 WL 3499884, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9312 (9th Cir. June 4,
2015) (en banc)
Wesley J. Furlong
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Big Lagoon Rancheria v.
California is, thus far, perhaps the most important Indian law decision in 2015.
Rejecting its three-judge panel’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, affirmed the
importance of defending tribal sovereignty against invidious state actions. The
court denounced California’s use of Carcieri to de-recognize the Big Lagoon
Rancheria and rescind the trust status of its land, characterizing it as “a belated
collateral attack” on the Tribe and an “end-run” around the APA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California concerned whether the State of
California (“State”) could invoke Carcieri v. Salazar1 to invalidate the Secretary
of the Interior’s (“Secretary”) decision to take an eleven-acre parcel of land into
trust for the Big Lagoon Rancheria (“Tribe”), eighteen years after the
entrustment.2 Sitting en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that Carcieri did not provide the State with standing to challenge
the entrustment of the Tribe’s land. 3 The Ninth Circuit held that the State’s
challenge to the Secretary’s decision to take an eleven-acre parcel of land into
trust represented merely “‘a garden-variety’” Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) claim, not a substantive challenge to an agency action. 4 The court
decried the State’s challenge to the entrustment as “a belated collateral attack” on
the Tribe.5 Indeed, the court viewed the State’s suit as an “end-run” around the
APA, noting that the State’s claim far surpassed the APA’s six-year statute of
limitations.6
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) provides the framework
by which gaming within Indian country is regulated. 7 The IGRA was passed
because tribes, as sovereign nations, were not subject to state gaming
regulations. 8 The IGRA requires tribes and states to enter into compacts

1

Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, Nos. 10-17803, 10-17878, ___ F.3d ___,
2015 WL 3499884, at *3 (9th Cir. June 4, 2015) (en banc) [hereinafter Big Lagoon V].
3
Id. at *4.
4
Id. (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (2012)).
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Id.
6
Id. at *5
7
See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 and 18 U.S.C. §§
1166-1168 (1988).
8
See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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concerning the regulation of class III gaming, 9 thus creating “a ‘cooperative
federalis[t]’ framework” for the regulation of gaming.10 The IGRA mandates that
states negotiate these compacts in good faith with tribes.11 Gaming facilities must
be located on “Indian lands.”12 Under the IGRA, Indian lands means “any land
within the limits of any Indian reservation . . . [and] any lands . . . held in trust by
the Unites States.” 13 The Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) 14 grants the
Secretary the authority to take land in to trust “for the purpose of providing land
for Indians.” 15 The IRA was passed in 1934 to provide tribes with the tools
necessary to promote tribal self-governance and self-determination.
Carcieri has severely curtailed the Secretary’s authority to take land in to
trust for many tribes. In 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
the Secretary could not acquire land to be held in trust for tribes which were not
federally recognized in 1934 – the year the IRA was passed.16 Carcieri involved
the State of Connecticut’s APA challenge to the Secretary’s decision to take land
into trust for the Narragansett Tribe.17 The Supreme Court ruled that the phrase
“now under Federal Jurisdiction” in § 19 of the IRA18 “unambiguously” extends
the benefits of the IRA – and in particular 25 U.S.C. § 465 – only “to those tribes
that were under the federal jurisdiction of the Unite States when the IRA was
enacted in 1934.” 19 Since the Narragansett Tribe was not “under Federal
jurisdiction” in 1934, the Supreme Court determined the Secretary’s entrustment
of thirty-one acres was invalid.20
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Big Lagoon Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe in
Northern California, consists of two adjacent parcels of land.21 The Bureau of
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) purchased a nine-acre parcel for James Charley in 1918.22
Charley was an Indian, and following his death, the family moved off the land.23
9

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C), (3)(A). “Class III gaming . . . involves ‘the types of
high-stakes games usually associated with Nevada-style gambling.’” Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL
3499884, at *1 (quoting In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003)).
10
Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at *1 (bracket in original).
11
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
12
Id. at § 2710(d)(1).
13
Id. at § 2703(4).
14
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934).
15
Id. at § 465.
16
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395.
17
Id. at 385.
18
25 U.S.C. § 479 (“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons
of Indian decent who are members of any recognized tribe now under federal jurisdiction, and
all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.” Id. (emphasis added)).
19
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395.
20
Id. at 385.
21
Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at *2.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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Robert Charley, one of Charley’s sons, was thought to have lived on the land
between 1942 and 1946; otherwise, the land sat vacant.24 Sometime later, Robert
Charley’s nephew obtained permission from the BIA to camp on the land.25 The
nephew viewed the land as a Rancheria, as in 1967 they applied for dissolution
and termination under the California Rancheria Termination Act. 26 The Big
Lagoon Rancheria first appeared as a federally recognized tribe in 1979.27
In 1994, the Secretary acquired an eleven-acre parcel of land adjacent to
the original parcel and placed it in to trust.28 In an attempt to establish a class III
gaming facility on the eleven-acre parcel, the Tribe entered into exhaustive
negotiations with the State.29 When negotiations broke down in 1999, the Tribe
sued, alleging that the State had negotiated in bad faith.30 The Tribe and the State
settled in 2005, and negotiated a compact that allowed the tribe to build a casino
and hotel.31 However, in 2007, the State legislature failed to ratify the compact.32
New negotiations proved futile, and in 2009 the Tribe brought this case, again
alleging the State had negotiated in bad faith.
Initially, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California ruled in favor of the Tribe.33 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.34 Relying on Carcieri, the panel found
that since the tribe was not “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, the entrustment
of the eleven-acre parcel was invalid.35 Accordingly, the court determined that
the State did not act in bad faith as the Tribe lacked standing under the IGRA to
compel negotiations.36
III. ANALYSIS
A. Carciere v. Salazar: Administrative or Substantive Challenge?
Citing Carcieri, the Ninth Circuit originally determined that since the
Tribe did not appear under Federal Jurisdiction until 1979, it could not have land
taken into trust by the Secretary. 37 The Tribe argued that the State needed to
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id. (discussing Pub. L. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958)).
27
Id.; see Indian Tribal Entities that Have a Government-to-Government
Relationship with the United States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979).
28
Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at *2.
29
Id. at **2-3.
30
Id. at *3.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
[hereinafter Big Lagoon I].
34
Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 741 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter
Big Lagoon III].
35
Id. at 1044-45.
36
Id. at 1045.
37
Id.
25
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challenge the entrustment as a final agency action under the APA.38 Since the
six-year APA statute of limitations had expired, the Tribe argued the State’s
challenge was untimely.39 The thee-judge panel disagreed.
“[S]ubstantive challenges to agency action–for example, claims
that agency action is unconstitutional, that it exceeds the scope of
the agency’s substantive authority, or that it is premised on an
erroneous interpretation of a statutory term–have no time bars.”40
Finding the entrustment exceeded the Secretary’s “substantive authority, the
court allowed the State’s challenge, even after the statute of limitations expired.41
However, en banc, the Ninth Circuit firmly rejected this interpretation.42
The court distinguished the present case from Carcieri, noting Carcieri had
“involved a timely administrative challenge” to the Secretary’s entrustment of
thirty-one acres for the Narragansett Tribe.43 The court stated that Carcieri did
not address whether the secretary’s entrustment of land can be challenged outside
the APA and after the expiration of the statute of limitations.44
The court determined that a challenge to the Secretary’s entrustment of
land “is ‘a garden-variety APA claim.’” 45 The court stated that “[t]he proper
vehicle” to challenge the Sectary’s action “is a petition for review pursuant to the
APA.”46 The court emphasized that the State had not challenged the entrustment
under the APA.47 The court viewed “[t]he instant case [as] a belated collateral
attack” on the Tribe and an “end-run” around the APA.48 The Court stated that
the State could not use “‘collateral proceedings to end-run the procedural
requirements’” of the APA.49 The court noted that regardless of the claim being
“time barred,” the State failed to join the United States and the Secretary.50
B. Further Holdings
The court also dismissed the State’s challenge to the tribe’s Federal
recognition. 51 While the court acknowledging “that it [was] unclear” how the
38

Id. at 1042.
Id.
40
Id. at 1043 (quoting Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 293
(2d Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added).
41
Id.
42
Big Lagoon V, 2015 WL 3499884, at **4-5.
43
Id. *4.
44
Id.
45
Id. (quoting Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2208).
46
Id.
47
Id. at *5.
48
Id. **4, 5 (emphasis added).
49
Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Backlund, 689 F.3d 986, 1000 (9th Cir.
2012)).
50
Id.
51
Id.
39
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Tribe gained federal recognition, it noted that the State had not brought an APA
challenge to the Secretary’s recognition of the Tribe.52 The court also dismissed
the State’s challenge of the district court’s refusal to grant a continuance to put
off compact negotiations until the case was ultimately resolved. 53 The Ninth
Circuit found that a continuance might have been appropriate if the State had
filed a timely APA challenge.54 Since the Tribe was “properly recognized,” the
court determined that the properness of the entrustment was “irrelevant” in the
context of determining if the State had negotiated in bad faith. 55 The Ninth
Circuit additionally dismissed the Tribe’s claims against the State on appeal as
moot. 56 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgement, determining that the State had not negotiated in good faith,
and ordering the parties conclude a compact.57
IV. CONCLUSION
En banc, the Ninth Circuit firmly rejected the notion that Carcieri
provides states with a collateral attack on the very sovereignty of tribes. While
the en banc opinion relies on a highly textual reading of Carcieri and the APA,
its broad implications cannot be downplayed. Carcieri represents a serious
challenge to smaller, newer recognized tribes, by failing to take into
consideration the history of the systematic termination of tribes throughout
United States. Indeed, the IRA was past as a tool to promote tribal selfgovernance and self-determination. Carcieri’s holding circumscribes recently
recognized tribes’ sovereignty. The Ninth Circuit, however, recognized the
reality these tribes face in asserting self-governance and fostering economic
development. The court recognized that such collateral attacks “would cast doubt
over countless acres of land that have been taken into trust for tribes recognized
by the federal government.”58 The en banc opinion has the potential to protect
numerous tribes from such collateral attacks. Indeed, Alabama is currently
attempting to use Carcieri and Big Lagoon III to halt the ongoing gaming
operations of three casinos owned by the Poarch Band of Creek Indian. 59
Alabama’s attempt was not successful with the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama.60 Alabama’s appeal is pending before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

52

Id.
Id. at * 5-6.
54
Id. at *6.
55
Id. (discussing Big Lagoon I, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1160).
56
Id.
57
Id. at *7.
58
Id. at *5.
59
See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1182-84 (M.D. Ala.
2014); see Appellant’s Br. at 27-30, Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 2014 WL 3389116 (11th
Cir. July 7, 2014) (No.14-12004-DD).
60
PCI Gaming, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1183-84.
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